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Abstract 
High-profile web servers often become the victim of 
web server overload Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) 
attacks. Motivations of such attacks range from technical 
challenge (e.g. script kiddies) to financial profit (e.g. 
blackmailing the web server’s owner).  
This paper presents the DIADEM Firewall architecture 
that allows an ISP to protect its customers from being the 
target of a DDoS attack. Additionally, it provides protection 
against usage of customer hosts for attacks. Furthermore, 
the use-case of the web server overload attack detection and 
response mechanism will be explained in more details. 
Finally, we outline the integration an FPGA based high-
speed classifier engine integrated into the Linux Netfilter 
firewall as well as its deployment during a response action 
against the DDoS attack.  
1. Introduction 
Today’s networking environments are becoming more 
and more complex. The number and diversity of deployed 
network devices and configurations is rising and the 
diversity of services offered and used is increasing. On the 
other hand, broadband Internet access is becoming a 
commodity for more and more Internet users. 
However, networking environments have not only 
increased the utility provided for the users, they have also 
become prone to various kinds of malicious activities and 
security threats. Attacks and the tools used to perform them 
are getting more and more sophisticated and harmful by 
exploiting the increasing number of permanently connected 
and often badly secured customer hosts. Such hosts are 
susceptible to worm and virus infections, and once infected, 
they can be easily misused as attack sources in Distributed 
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. Firewalls as well as 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) are 
used to detect such malicious activities and to protect the 
networking environment and other potential victims, such 
as web servers, corporate networks etc. However, these 
systems are usually operated as standalone devices 
protecting an isolated subsystem or network only. 
Possibilities for coordinated operation are very limited and 
mostly realized on a manual basis. Hence, the existing 
attack detection and prevention systems are not sufficiently 
effective as countermeasures against sophisticated attacks 
and upcoming threats. 
In the scope of the DIADEM1 Firewall project  [1], we 
are developing an architecture that enables an ISP (Internet 
Service Provider) to better protect its own networking 
environment as well as the connected hosts and servers of 
its customers. The main goal of the project is to establish a 
tight loop of detection, decision and response across 
multiple, distributed firewall and networking devices. 
In this paper, we present our approach on the basis of 
one selected use-case, the web server overload DDoS 
attack. During such an attack, multiple distributed attack 
sources attempt to overload a web server by simultaneously 
requesting a given object located on the server. Depending 
on the number of attackers and the performance of the web 
server, the attack causes service degradation or even 
Denial-of-Service for legitimate users. This attack is 
common today and has various properties we can expect 
from new and forthcoming attacks.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follow. An 
overview of the overall DIADEM Firewall architecture is 
presented in section  2. The general attack detection 
architecture and particularly the web server overload attack 
detection mechanism are explained in section 3, followed 
by a description of the response architecture and the web 
server use-case related response actions in section  4. 
Section  5 outlines how a high-speed packet classifier engine 
implemented on an FPGA is deployed for efficient 
mitigation of the attack. Finally, conclusions and directions 
for future work are given in section 6. 
2. Overall Architecture of DIADEM Firewall 
This section gives an overview of the architecture of 
DIADEM Firewall and presents its high-level components. 
As shown in Figure 1, we separate the different components 
of the architecture according to three levels: data level, 
element level and administrative level. 
2.1. The Data Level 
The data level contains the equipment that deals with 
the actual traffic in the operator’s network. Considered 
                                                 
1 short for DIstributed Approach for a high-speed 
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devices include routers, network monitors, and firewalls 
that are used for network monitoring and response 
purposes. Project results include implementations of 
innovative components with special monitoring and 
response functionality that are evaluated in scenarios with 
commercial and open-source (Linux) routers and firewalls. 
2.2. The Element Level 
The element level is an abstraction layer for the data 
level equipment, which hides device specific details by 
providing abstract interfaces (APIs) to control the 
equipment in the data level independently of its specific 
control interface. Two types of components are considered: 
Monitoring Elements and Firewall Elements. 
Monitoring Element (ME) 
The Monitoring Element is an abstraction of a router or 
a metering device that monitors traffic at a specific point in 
the network and exports both flow and packet-based 
monitoring data to a remote system called Violation 
Detection (c.f. section  2.3) for further analysis. Flow-based 
data consists of statistics such as the number of packets and 
the number of octets observed during the reporting interval 
for a specific source-destination flow. Packet-based 
information includes packets that are selected with filtering 
and packet sampling methods. The Monitoring Element can 
also provide statistics about packets with specific header 
fields, for instance, the number of observed TCP SYN 
packets or ICMP echo request packets within a given time 
interval. The Monitoring Element can also be configured to 
focus on application specific data such as HTTP traffic to 
detect web server attacks. Section 3 explains the 
corresponding monitoring and detection process in more 
detail. 
The Monitoring Element provides a Monitoring API to 
the administrative level for dynamically setting and 
changing the monitoring configuration. Thus, the network 
monitoring process and exported monitoring data can be 
adapted to the current needs of the Violation Detection 
system. 
Monitored data is exported from the Monitoring 
Element to the Violation Detection system using the IPFIX 
(IP Flow Information Export) protocol  [2] which is 
currently standardized in the IETF. The strength of the 
IPFIX protocol resides in its capability to carry any kind of 
data records in a bandwidth-efficient way.  
The Monitoring API is realized using the Netconf 
protocol  [3] which is also currently standardized in the 
IETF. The Netconf protocol is very flexible and can be 
easily adapted to different configuration tasks. 
The Firewall Element (FE) 
The Firewall Element is an abstraction for a router or a 
firewall device that allows enforcing response policies in 
order to stop or mitigate an attack. Response policies may 
require that one or more specific data flows are blocked, 
redirected or rate-limited. The Firewall Element offers a 
Firewall API and a Response API to the administrative 
level. Hiding the device-specific details of the data level 
components, the Firewall API can be used to trigger 
immediate actions. On the other hand, the Response API 
delivers response policies to the Firewall Element that allow 
for making fast local decisions. 
2.3. The Administrative Level 
The administrative level allows the system administrator 
of to enter new policies, new attack counter-measure logic, 
and take decisions when needed for a counter-measure. It 
comprises two components: Violation Detection and System 
Manager. 
Violation Detection (VD) 
The Violation Detection system receives the monitoring 
data from Monitoring Elements which are distributed in the 
network. It then performs a variety of attack detection 
methods deploying both signature-based and anomaly 
detection techniques. If an attack is detected, information 
about the type of attack, the target, recognized attack 
sources etc. is encoded into IDEMF (Intrusion Detection 
Exchange Message Format)  [4] messages and sent as an 
alert notification to the System Manager.  
The Violation Detection is described in more details in 
Section  3. 
System Manager (SM) 
The System Manager integrates a policy service for 
specifying, storing and distributing policies to Policy 
Management Agents (PMAs). PMAs can be deployed in the 
Violation Detection, the Firewall Elements, and in the 
System Manager itself. 
PMAs receive events via a publish-subscribe system. 
Upon reception of a new event, a PMA searches for a 
matching policy and enforces the corresponding action(s) if 
necessary. For example, the PMA of the System Manager 
might receive an attack notification event from the 
Violation Detection. A policy specifies how to react, e.g. by 
calling the Firewall API in order to perform a specific 
response action on the Firewall Element, or by triggering a 
reconfiguration of the Violation Detect to adapt its 
detection strategy. 
The functionality of the System Manager is explained in 
more details in Section 4. 
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2.4. Deployment 
Figure 2 sketches the deployment of the DIADEM 
Firewall architecture in an operator’s network. The network 
is equipped with several highly distributed Monitoring 
Elements that deliver monitoring data to the Violation 
Detection which analyzes the data in order to detect 
ongoing attacks. If an attack is detected or suspected by the 
Violation Detection, a notification message is sent to the 
System Manager which uses this information to determine 
and trigger the appropriate response to the attack. A typical 
response consists of blocking, redirecting, or rate-limiting 
the suspicious traffic. This requires the reconfiguration of 
the appropriate Firewall Elements. 
Ideally, if the source(s) of the attack can be correctly 
identified, the attack traffic can be blocked as close as 
possible to the source generating the attack. This prevents 
attack traffic from reaching the victim and reduces 
unwanted traffic within the network. 
Like the Monitoring and Firewall Elements in the 
element level, the components of the administrative level 
(Violation Detection and System Manager) can also be 
distributed for performance reasons or to avoid single 
points of failures.  
2.5. Inter-Domain Deployment 
Cooperation between different administrative domains 
is advantageous for network monitoring as well as for 
attack detection and response. However, a strong trust 
relationship between cooperating network providers is 
required. Handing out monitoring data would also reveal 
the network topology and information about network 
performance and utilization etc. Furthermore, customer’s 
privacy comes into question here. Less difficult is the 
dissemination of alert notifications between distinct 
administrative domains. Upon receiving an alert from 
another domain, the System Manager can decide to enforce 
appropriate countermeasures immediately, or to ask the 
local Violation Detection at first if the attack can also be 
observed in the own domain. Depending on the trust 
relationship with the foreign domain, the System Manager 
might also decide to ignore a foreign alert completely. Note 
that a System Manager will not usually be permitted to 
enforce response actions or policies on Firewall Elements 
belonging to a different domain.  
3. Violation Detection 
This section describes the Violation Detection 
architecture within DIADEM Firewall. In particular, a 
detection module for web server overloading is presented. 
3.1. Architecture 
As represented in Figure 4, the Violation Detection 
system is organized in several modules: 
- The IPFIX collector receives monitoring data from 
Monitoring Elements. 
- Detection modules apply detection methods on the 
monitoring data. Detection results are then passed to 
the PMA as IDEMF events. Existing detection tools 
(e.g. Snort  [5]) may be integrated in the violation 
detection function as detection modules. 
- The Policy Management Agent (PMA) stores and 
interprets detection policies which may be triggered by 
IDMEF events or can be used to filter events. Possible 
actions are notify, log, store, defer the event to an 
investigation module, or discard the event. Other 
actions might be to reconfigure the Monitoring 
Elements to get more information about current traffic. 
- The event database is used to store interesting IDMEF 
events for later investigation and correlation with other 
events. 
- The investigation modules examine events that cannot 
be clearly classified by detection modules. Possible 
investigation methods include:  
o compare/correlate an event with earlier events 
stored in the event database 
o reconfigure detection modules and/or Monitoring 
Elements  
If the investigation module concludes that an event is 
an attack, a new IDMEF event is passed to the PMA. 
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- The notification module sends IDMEF events (alarm 
notifications) to the System Manager or other Violation 
Detection components. 
- The external event module constitutes the counterpart 
of the notification module. It receives IDMEF events 
from the System Manager and other Violation 
Detection components and controls which events are 
passed to the PMA. 
- The management module exports a management and 
configuration interface to the System Manager. It 
provides a start-up configuration to all modules in the 
Violation Detection and to the associated Monitoring 
Elements and maintains management data in 
management database. 
3.2. Web Server Overload Detection Module 
The overall behavior of the Web Server Overload 
Detection Module is to build a view of application level 
actions from the network-level measurement parameters 
provided by the IPFIX collector. These inferred application 
level actions are used to detect overloading attacks by 
matching detected results with a detection model. When an 
attack is detected, an IDMEF event is sent to the PMA 
within the Violation Detection system. Each Web Overload 
Detection Module is expected to monitor traffic directed to 
and originating from a specific web server. As a result, 
models and training data used by each module are server 
specific. 
The Web Server Overload Detection Module consists of 
four components as shown in Figure 3. 
- The parameters extraction component receives IPFIX 
records from the IPFIX collector, selects those that are 
relevant for the monitored targets, and extracts the 
useful measurement parameters. Monitored targets 
include potential victims (web server address and port 
number) as well as potential attackers (e.g. IP 
addresses). The definition of monitored targets is 
included in the target database. 
- The parameter estimation components transform the 
extracted measurement parameters into input 
parameters that are adapted to the inference engine. For 
example, IP addresses may be transformed into country 
codes in order to limit the size of the inference model. 
Each parameter may need a different form of correction 
or adaptation. For each parameter, the estimation 
function looks up the corresponding model from the 
estimation database which defines the necessary 
transformation depending on the type of parameter as 
well as the target web server. In the case of the IP 
address to country code transformation, this model 
would be a data structure representing relationships 
between these two parameters. 
- The inference engine infers information about the 
invoked HTTP operation (HTTP method, targeted URI, 
operation result, etc.) from the parameters received by 
the estimation components. In contrast to classical 
application level processing schemes, the inference 
engine retrieves application level information based on 
probabilistic models applied to the measurement results 
from lower levels. Thus, the inference approach does 
not require expensive packet processing including 
reassembly and pattern matching and allows for a 
faster, yet less precise application level parameters 
estimation  [6]. For each estimated element, the 
inference engine selects the corresponding inference 
model from the inference database. This model derives 
a tuple including the identity of the user (IP address), 
the performed action (HTTP header values), and the 
target web server from the estimated input parameters. 
Although inference models are target specific, we 
separate the definition of targets from the definition of 
models for efficiency reasons. The definition of targets 
may change frequently (several times an hour) while 
the modification of models should happen less 
frequently (for example, once a month or more often 
depending on the frequency of the server’s content 
update). 
The detection engine checks if the tuple received from 
the inference engine conforms to normal target behavior. 
Therefore, profiles of normal behavior are stored in the 
detection database. The detection engine retrieves the 
appropriate profile from the database and compares it to the 
received tuple. A profile represents the normal HTTP server 
behavior as well as the acceptable deviation. Profiles are 
built incrementally using received tuples and a change 
detection algorithm. The profile is used, along with the 
identity of the source, to decide whether an overload attack 
is going on. If an attack is detected, an alert is sent to the 
notification component which sends a corresponding 
IDMEF event to the PMA. The IDMEF event includes the 
identity of the victim (address and port), the identity of the 
attack sources (IP addresses and port numbers), the type of 
attack (used method, impacted URI, operation result etc.), 
the level of deviation between the attacker’s behavior and a 
normal behavior, and the number of packets and bytes 
related to the communication. 
4. Attack Response Mechanisms 
This section describes the System Manager architecture 
and how it communicates with other modules in the 
DIADEM Firewall architecture in Figure 1. 
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4.1. The System Manager 
The System Manager mainly communicates with the 
Violation Detection system and the Firewall Elements, as 
indicated in Figure 5. 
The System Manager receives IDMEF notifications 
from the Violation Detection system indicating the type of 
attack, the target and the presumed source(s) of the attack, 
the signature of the attack etc. The System Manager uses 
this information to determine the appropriate 
countermeasures against the attack. Notifications may result 
in the reconfiguration of the Violation Detection or the 
Firewall Elements in order to respond to the detected attack. 
The appropriate response actions are specified by response 
policies enabled by the System Manager. When 
notifications related to a given attack are no longer received 
over a given period of time, the System Manager stops the 
enforced response actions and restores the prior state of the 
system. 
The System Manager provides reports to the DIADEM 
Firewall architecture administrator as well as to the 
impacted customer regarding the detection and the 
treatment of the attack. 
4.2. Response Policies 
Response policies specify the actions needed to be 
undertaken in order to stop or mitigate the attack, making 
use of any of the parameters provided by the triggering alert 
notification. In case of an automated response, they equate 
to one of the following:  
• perform an action on an Firewall Element, such as 
redirection, rate limiting etc., 
• perform an action on the Violation Detection 
component; e.g. reconfigure the Violation Detection 
for further investigation of the attack, or 
• generate and send a new event to the Violation 
Detection system or to a Firewall Element. 
In addition, human network administrators can be 
informed if manual intervention is required. 
4.3. Policy Management Agents 
Automated policy enforcement is entrusted to Policy 
Management Agents (PMAs) that act as local policy 
interpreters in the Violation Detection system and the 
Firewall Elements. Once policies are compiled, they are 
loaded and enabled in the PMAs. The Elvin event system 
 [7] is used for communication with and between the PMAs. 
PMAs only subscribe to those events which are relevant to 
their stored policies. On receiving an event, the PMA 
queries a domain service to determine the target objects on 
which to perform the policy action(s). A policy can 
optionally specify constraints which must evaluate to true 
before the action can be performed. 
4.4. Web Server Overload Response 
When the Violation Detection system detects a web 
server attack, it notifies the System Manager, which 
inspects the attack signature and may decide to reconfigure 
the Violation Detection to improve the detection result. For 
example, the Violation Detection system can be asked to 
look for a more specific attack signature or to increase the 
confidence in the detection result in order to reduce the 
probability of false positives. As a consequence, it might be 
necessary that the Violation Detection system also 
reconfigures the associated Monitoring Elements to provide 
more detailed monitoring data. 
If the alert notification is severe enough, the 
corresponding response policy may trigger a response 
mechanism on the Firewall Elements. The web server 
overload attack requires established TCP connections 
between the attackers and the victim. Therefore, the sources 
of the attack can be identified easily. An effective response 
consists in: 
- setting new firewall rules that drop all packets 
originated by the attacking sources and directed to the 
web server and 
- closing the TCP connection by inserting a TCP FIN or 
RST packet towards the server. Note here, that the 
inserted packet must carry the right sequence number.  
While the firewall rules prevent the attackers from 
sending more HTTP requests, closing the existing TCP 
connections immediately releases the web server by 
stopping the currently served requests. Both functionalities 
are provided by a Linux based firewall implementation. In 
order to speed up the packet filtering, we make use of a 
packet classifier engine as presented in section  5. 
 Figure 6 shows an example of the policy that triggers 
the closing of a TCP connection under the condition that the 
confidence in the detection result exceeds a predefined 
minimum confidence level. 
Whether a response to an attack is successful or not, 
does not only depend on the functionality of the firewall 
devices but also on the points in the network where the 
inst oblig /SMPolicies/signatureBasedAlert { 
 on webAttack(attack_signature, confidence); 
 subject /PMA/SM; 
 target t = /PMA/FE; 
 do t.closeTCPConnection(attack_signature); 
 when confidence > MIN_CONFIDENCE; } 
Figure 6: Trigger Connection Closing 
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firewall devices are located. In general, it is desirable to 
install countermeasures as close as possible to the attack 
sources. Thus, the System Manager has to identify those 
firewall devices that are closest to the sources and that 
provide the required functionality. 
Finally, response actions should be stopped when the 
attack has finished. Though, it is often not possible to 
determine if the attack has finished as long as the response 
actions are enforced. In case of the web server overload 
attack, the firewall rules are removed after a certain period 
of time. Incoming traffic from the attacker will be analyzed 
further for a faster detection and response in case the attack 
persists. 
5. High-Speed Packet Classification 
As described in section  2.2, the Firewall Element is an 
abstraction for a router or a firewall device that allows 
enforcing response policies in order to stop or mitigate an 
attack. Such a firewall device can be a software firewall 
such as Linux Netfilter or a commercial hardware firewall. 
In the scope of the DIADEM Firewall project, a high-
speed packet Classifier Engine (CE) is developed and 
integrated into a Netfilter-based software firewall in order 
to offload the processing-intensive packet classification 
function from the firewall system into hardware for very 
high-speed links. The CE is based on the P2C algorithm  [8] 
which is a multi-field packet classification scheme that 
searches the fields independently in a first phase and 
determines the final classification result using a TCAM in a 
second phase. The P2C concept is shown in Figure 7 for 5-
tuple classification. 
A key element of the P2C scheme is novel encoding of 
the intermediate search results, which allows a significant 
reduction of the storage requirements and minimizes the 
dependencies within the field search structures, thus 
enabling fast incremental updates. The encoding involves 
several styles that can be applied simultaneously and allow 
several performance aspects to be balanced at the 
granularity of individual rules. The scheme can be used in 
combination with various search algorithms and memory 
technologies. The P2C implementation for the CE performs 
the field searches using the Balanced Routing Table search 
(BaRT) algorithm  [9]. BaRT is a scheme for exact- and 
prefix-match searches that achieves wire-speed search 
performance in combination with high storage-efficiency 
and fast dynamic updates, through application of a novel 
hash function. BaRT can efficiently process the search key 
in segments of about 8 bits, requiring in the worst-case only 
four memory accesses to search a 32-bit IP address and two 
accesses for a 16-bit port number, all of which can be 
performed efficiently in a pipelined fashion. A detailed 
description of BaRT is presented in  [9]. 
FPGA prototypes based on the combination of P2C and 
BaRT have demonstrated the feasibility of achieving wire-
speed classification performance for OC-192 and OC-768 
with off-the-shelf technology. The prototype supported 
1733 rules of a commercial firewall using only 2 KB of 
SRAM in combination with 5 KB of TCAM. 
The CE will be implemented on an FPGA board and 
connected to a Linux Netfilter firewall through a PCI bus. It 
will be configured and initialized through the upper layer 
software of the Firewall Element. The lookup tables, which 
are a set of packet filter rules, are embedded in SRAM. The 
multi-field search, currently performed through a TCAM 
can also be implemented using TCAM emulation in SRAM. 
The communication between the Firewall Element and the 
CE is realized through an API located in user space and a 
loadable kernel module embedded in the Linux kernel. The 
basic architecture can be seen in Figure 8. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we discussed DDoS attack detection and 
response, in particular the web server overload DDoS 
attack. To date, no efficient and cost-effective solution for 
the detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks is available. 
This is mostly for the reason that DDoS attacks can be 
detected at the victim, but effective countermeasures need 
to be enforced closer to the attack sources. Thus, protection 
systems deployed at a single point in the network cannot 
cope with DDoS attacks efficiently.  
The DIADEM Firewall architecture is a significant 
improvement as it provides distributed detection and 
mitigation of DDoS attacks within the network. We did 
present how to deploy the DIADEM Firewall architecture 
as a protection against web server overload attacks, which 
present a common threat to high-profile web servers. 
Finally, we showed how response actions are accelerated 
using a high-speed packet classifier engine.  
Next steps of the project include experiments in a test 
environment that resembles an operational broadband 
network. Furthermore, the DIADEM Firewall architecture 
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will be used to implement efficient detection and response 
mechanisms against other highly distributed DoS attacks, 
such as TCP SYN flood attacks, profiting from the 
distributed nature of the DIADEM Firewall architecture.  
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